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It’s easier to talk about love than about the debt crisis. Talking about the debt crisis, however, can be lovely. The
conference “A Debt Restructuring Mechanism for European Sovereigns. Do We Need A Legal Procedure?”  at
Humboldt University on January 13 and 14 was a demonstration of lovely crisis conversation.
Christoph Paulus, Professor of Private Law at Humboldt University, had convened a group of economists and
lawyers, academics and practitioners from Europe, the USA, Latin America and Japan to discuss causes and
responses to the European debt crisis. Even though the emphasis of the conference lay on Europe, and more
speciﬁcally a formal restructuring mechanism for sovereign debt in Europe, voices from outside enriched the debate,
presenting legal approaches to the indebtedness of states and municipalities in the United States and Japan.
Listening to the presentations and debates was in several ways reassuring. Not only was the tone and atmosphere
so cordial and friendly, the discussions also conveyed the impression of broad consensus among the presenters as
to the feasibility and desirability of legal procedures for an orderly debt restructuring.
Some of the participants are directly involved in the ongoing crisis management. Among them Ludger Schuknecht,
economist at the Ministry of Finance, who stood in for Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. His speech did not
surprise – the essence being: We are on the right track – dealing with the current crisis as well as preventing and
addressing future crises. He stressed the importance of avoiding a disorderly default and the need for a more rule-
based governance – the latter to be achieved through the European Stability Mechanism and reforms to the Stability
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and Growth Pact’s preventive and corrective arms, including the new ﬁscal compact. His optimism also extended to
the ongoing negotiations on private sector involvement (i.e. the voluntary taking of losses by private investors) in the
handling of the Greek crisis which were likely to be concluded successfully (on Friday evening successful
conclusion still was not in sight). The crisis countries themselves had to address the root causes of the crisis by
reducing public debt and budget deﬁcits and increasing their competitiveness. This required structural reforms
including spending cuts and ﬂexibilizing labour markets. With respect to the narrower conference topic, Schuknecht
pointed to the decision of the European Council of 26 March 2011  to include collective action clauses in all new euro
area government securities from July 2013.
Being Poor as a Good Thing?
A number of people in the audience, myself included, wished the speaker would concretize the recent intentions of
Merkel and Sarkozy to address unemployment, explain how the small steps towards ﬁnancial regulation taken so far
would restore the primacy of politics over the ﬁnancial markets. Instead he emphasized the importance of restoring
market conﬁdence and praised the virtues of being poor. Sometimes, he responded to a question by the Irish
ambassador, it is better to have little money since little money tends to be spent more eﬃciently.
Michael Burda, Professor of Economics at Humboldt University, subsequently set out to explain the economic
causes of the crisis. He too did not go much beyond the diagnosis of over-borrowing and otherwise unsustainable
ﬁscal policies. He did not use the opportunity to critically evaluate the oﬃcial German position favoring austerity, for
example by addressing fundamental challenges faced by European economies including how to ensure
competitiveness of service-oriented economies vis-à-vis economies based on manufacturing  and – more generally –
how to address trade imbalances.
Mario Blejer, Governor of the Central Bank of Argentina during Argentina’s debt crisis, took a more critical stance,
especially regarding Germany’s opposition to the European Central Bank acting as a lender of last resort. Since this
matter had caused some confusion among lawyers I was particularly grateful for his clariﬁcation on how to think
about IMF lending in the European debt crisis. While countries – when insolvent – may have to default on foreign
debt, local debt (debt denominated in domestic currency) can always be paid and default never happens. The
country merely needs to enhance the supply of its currency. The situation is diﬀerent in the euro area where the
European Central Bank determines monetary policy, including money supply. If the European Central Bank refuses
to act as a lender of last resort, countries like Greece or Italy or Spain, in the words of Bleier, become like Panama
in that they do not have a domestic currency. Even debt denominated in Euro for them is foreign debt.
The IMF borrows from Europe to lend to Europe
To pay this debt the IMF now is lending Euros to European countries whose currency is the Euro (but which for them
amounts to a foreign currency). In short: the IMF borrows from Europe to lend to Europe. To Blejer this does not
make sense. Instead, the ECB should directly intervene as a lender of last resort and provide money to
governments. It should not only, as it currently does, provide indirect support through buying government bonds on
the secondary market or providing unlimited credit to banks. By now we all know the rationale for involving the IMF:
“Moral Hazard”. The detour via the IMF, Blejer fears, will damage its credibility; not only because it would not be
needed if the ECB intervened (currently such intervention would violate EU law), but also because its acting as a
lender to Europe will lead to double standards. It is not to be expected that the IMF enforces conditionality as strictly
vis-à-vis European countries as it does towards developing countries.
All three presentations were fodder for controversial debate. However, the audience (of academics, practitioners and
civil servants) seemed quite content to take it all in (throughout the conference only one “Wutbürger” vented his
anger at the endless need to “pay, pay, pay”) and move to less disputed (really?) territory, namely the actual
workings of sovereign debt restructuring in situations of insolvency and the desirability of a formal legal procedure to
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facilitate and legitimize such restructuring.
On this point there seemed to be much real consensus – the economist Jeromin Zettelmeyer from the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development being slightly more skeptical about the need for a formal legal procedure
than his lawyer colleagues. A formal restructuring mechanism (along the lines of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism negotiated within the IMF at the beginning of the millennium until negotiations failed in 2004) could
facilitate an orderly default with negotiated haircuts by overcoming collective action problems, most importantly the
problem of hold-outs (which collective action clauses can only go so far in addressing). (I will spare you the details
on the pros and cons, many explanations on this topic can be found on the website of the International Insolvency
Institute).
What Is Won With A Legal Procedure?
A formal legal procedure for sovereign insolvency (or “resolvency” as Paulus would have it) could legitimate
sovereign debt restructuring by providing for non-discrimination among creditors, making restructuring more
transparent and inclusive and thus potentially more democratic. The latter point was stressed by Mathias Audit,
Professor of Law at Université de Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense). Not too surprisingly, it was the scholars from
the United States who critically questioned enthusiasm for a formal legal procedure. Thus, Anna Gelpern, Professor
of Law at American University, stressed that more was needed to make responses to sovereign default fairer or
more democratic. Law, as we should know, can also work the other way, by entrenching interest and power
constellations. She also pointed out that state banktruptcy in the United States (which currently is not a legal option)
was associated with right-wing politics seeking to weaken labour unions. Michael Waibel (Lecturer of International
Law at Cambridge) with his fascinating account of the Financial Commission of Control instituted in the 19th century
by European powers to administer Greece’s insolvency also wished to caution against over-optimism in legal
engineering.
The presentations and questions from the audience touched upon two speciﬁc issues which indeed may seriously
complicate things and impede the adoption of a formal restructuring mechanism that enhances legitimate debt
restructuring. One is the impact of ﬁnancial instruments such as Credit Default Swaps (insurances against sovereign
default) on the restructuring of sovereign debt. Another (related one) is the impact of the ﬁnance industry’s lobbying
on the political process.
Opinions on how Sovereign Default Swaps aﬀect debt restructuring processes diverged. Ernst-Moritz Lipp, former
chairman of the London Club and thus highly experienced with the restructuring of sovereign debt owed to private
creditors, stressed the contribution of derivatives to fundamental changes in ﬁnancial markets, their increased
intransparency and complexity. These changes made the transmission of defaults unpredictable, no one knew
whom and where exactly default would hit.
Shady Business
To the question how Credit Default Swaps aﬀect concrete restructuring negotiations, he answered that they did not
impede negotiations, that they even might facilitate them. This may be true. Indeed the argument that CDS holders
impede agreement on a haircut because they would gain from a legal default does not seem to hold: CDS holders
are no longer creditors of the sovereign and thus do not participate in the negotiations. However, it also seems true
and was emphasized by Jay Westbrook (Law Professor at University of Texas) that Credit Default Swaps and other
derivatives make the eﬀects of the restructuring unpredictable – eﬀects which may include insolvencies of
systemically important actors such as pension funds or insurances.
The second issue – how the ﬁnance industry impacts the political process — was largely spared. It seems however
crucial, not only since opposition by major ﬁnancial industry associations was one reason for the failure of
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negotiations at the IMF for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (as pointed out by Sean Hagan, General
Counsel at the IMF). I agree with John Plender’s recent comment in the FT that “[t]ackling such interest groups both
in the US and Europe is one of the biggest post-crisis tasks for policymakers and a key to addressing concerns
about systemic legitimacy”. It will be interesting to see whether this question will receive more attention at a
conference with slightly (a number of speakers are identical) greater participation of public lawyers in March at the
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid on Responsible Sovereign Financing. In an opening speech Armin von Bogdandy
will talk about “Sovereign Debt Restructurings as Exercises of Public Authority: Towards a Decentralized Sovereign
Insolvency Law.”
When in his concluding remarks Christoph Paulus tentatively asked whether the questions raised by sovereign
insolvency after all were not merely technical, but might call into doubt the viability of capitalism I was slightly
perplexed. True, questions as to the future of capitalism, its transformations in recent times and possible
reconciliation with the democratic welfare state were not discussed explicitly (except by Alessandro Somma,
Professor of Law at the Università di Ferrara) but they were looming large within the Senatssaal at Humboldt
University.
Why Occupy! Is Crucial
They were the questions that had brought me to this conference in the ﬁrst place and which made me wonder why
so few of my public law colleagues, working on questions of democracy and equality, attended. I do believe that we
as academics have a responsibility to attempt to understand the workings of ﬁnancial markets, their impact on
society, the role of law in shaping them. We have to try to understand in order to better articulate our dismay at
increased inequality, the disappearances of public libraries, swimming pools, unproﬁtable railroad tracks, our
inability to live sustainably. I do not want to buy that this is how we need to live in the future since we lived beyond
our means and now have to do our homework. (I am convinced that there are a lot of things we will need to give up
in order to save the planet (such as excessive air travel or ever new electronic appliances), but I am not ready to
believe that theaters, libraries, railroads, playgrounds, good public schools….must be among them).
For all the need to be rational and understand, however, it is also time to voice concern and call for reform before
everything is completely understood and we can fully predict the eﬀects – say of a ﬁnancial transaction tax or the
banning of over-the-counter traded derivatives. I agree with Ignacio Tirado (Law Professor at Universidad Autonomà
de Madrid) that this is the moment to act, and call for stricter regulation of ﬁnancial markets. This moment will pass if
we wait until we have fully understood everything. We need to express our outrage now (as Alexander Somma did)
at the transformation of welfare capitalism into some other form of capitalism which works well to enhance the
wealth of some, but which fails to promote public welfare.
That’s why I think Occupy! is so important and the criticism that it does no formulate concise demands entirely
mistaken. I also am convinced that we have to bring study and protest back together (at times at least). Seeing all
the black and grey suits at Humboldt University made me wish that our universities would become more colourful
again – places for fundamental debate in what kind of society we want to live, places where protest is voiced and not
only treated as the subject of scientiﬁc study. I was told that protests still happen at Humboldt University. At my
home institution where cafeterias turn into cocktail lounges at night and auditoriums are named after banks this
seems increasingly unlikely.
Isabel Feichtner is an associate professor for Law and Economics at Goethe University Frankfurt.
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By ISABEL FEICHTNER
It’s easier to talk about love than about the debt crisis. Talking about the debt crisis, however, can be lovely. The
conference “A Debt Restructuring Mechanism for European Sovereigns. Do We Need A Legal Procedure?”  at
Humboldt University on January 13 and 14 was a demonstration of lovely crisis conversation.
Christoph Paulus, Professor of Private Law at Humboldt University, had convened a group of economists and
lawyers, academics and practitioners from Europe, the USA, Latin America and Japan to discuss causes and
responses to the European debt crisis. Even though the emphasis of the conference lay on Europe, and more
speciﬁcally a formal restructuring mechanism for sovereign debt in Europe, voices from outside enriched the debate,
presenting legal approaches to the indebtedness of states and municipalities in the United States and Japan.
Listening to the presentations and debates was in several ways reassuring. Not only was the tone and atmosphere
so cordial and friendly, the discussions also conveyed the impression of broad consensus among the presenters as
to the feasibility and desirability of legal procedures for an orderly debt restructuring.
Some of the participants are directly involved in the ongoing crisis management. Among them Ludger Schuknecht,
economist at the Ministry of Finance, who stood in for Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. His speech did not
surprise – the essence being: We are on the right track – dealing with the current crisis as well as preventing and
addressing future crises. He stressed the importance of avoiding a disorderly default and the need for a more rule-
based governance – the latter to be achieved through the European Stability Mechanism and reforms to the Stability
and Growth Pact’s preventive and corrective arms, including the new ﬁscal compact. His optimism also extended to
the ongoing negotiations on private sector involvement (i.e. the voluntary taking of losses by private investors) in the
handling of the Greek crisis which were likely to be concluded successfully (on Friday evening successful
conclusion still was not in sight). The crisis countries themselves had to address the root causes of the crisis by
reducing public debt and budget deﬁcits and increasing their competitiveness. This required structural reforms
including spending cuts and ﬂexibilizing labour markets. With respect to the narrower conference topic, Schuknecht
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pointed to the decision of the European Council of 26 March 2011  to include collective action clauses in all new euro
area government securities from July 2013.
Being Poor as a Good Thing?
A number of people in the audience, myself included, wished the speaker would concretize the recent intentions of
Merkel and Sarkozy to address unemployment, explain how the small steps towards ﬁnancial regulation taken so far
would restore the primacy of politics over the ﬁnancial markets. Instead he emphasized the importance of restoring
market conﬁdence and praised the virtues of being poor. Sometimes, he responded to a question by the Irish
ambassador, it is better to have little money since little money tends to be spent more eﬃciently.
Michael Burda, Professor of Economics at Humboldt University, subsequently set out to explain the economic
causes of the crisis. He too did not go much beyond the diagnosis of over-borrowing and otherwise unsustainable
ﬁscal policies. He did not use the opportunity to critically evaluate the oﬃcial German position favoring austerity, for
example by addressing fundamental challenges faced by European economies including how to ensure
competitiveness of service-oriented economies vis-à-vis economies based on manufacturing  and – more generally –
how to address trade imbalances.
Mario Blejer, Governor of the Central Bank of Argentina during Argentina’s debt crisis, took a more critical stance,
especially regarding Germany’s opposition to the European Central Bank acting as a lender of last resort. Since this
matter had caused some confusion among lawyers I was particularly grateful for his clariﬁcation on how to think
about IMF lending in the European debt crisis. While countries – when insolvent – may have to default on foreign
debt, local debt (debt denominated in domestic currency) can always be paid and default never happens. The
country merely needs to enhance the supply of its currency. The situation is diﬀerent in the euro area where the
European Central Bank determines monetary policy, including money supply. If the European Central Bank refuses
to act as a lender of last resort, countries like Greece or Italy or Spain, in the words of Bleier, become like Panama
in that they do not have a domestic currency. Even debt denominated in Euro for them is foreign debt.
The IMF borrows from Europe to lend to Europe
To pay this debt the IMF now is lending Euros to European countries whose currency is the Euro (but which for them
amounts to a foreign currency). In short: the IMF borrows from Europe to lend to Europe. To Blejer this does not
make sense. Instead, the ECB should directly intervene as a lender of last resort and provide money to
governments. It should not only, as it currently does, provide indirect support through buying government bonds on
the secondary market or providing unlimited credit to banks. By now we all know the rationale for involving the IMF:
“Moral Hazard”. The detour via the IMF, Blejer fears, will damage its credibility; not only because it would not be
needed if the ECB intervened (currently such intervention would violate EU law), but also because its acting as a
lender to Europe will lead to double standards. It is not to be expected that the IMF enforces conditionality as strictly
vis-à-vis European countries as it does towards developing countries.
All three presentations were fodder for controversial debate. However, the audience (of academics, practitioners and
civil servants) seemed quite content to take it all in (throughout the conference only one “Wutbürger” vented his
anger at the endless need to “pay, pay, pay”) and move to less disputed (really?) territory, namely the actual
workings of sovereign debt restructuring in situations of insolvency and the desirability of a formal legal procedure to
facilitate and legitimize such restructuring.
On this point there seemed to be much real consensus – the economist Jeromin Zettelmeyer from the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development being slightly more skeptical about the need for a formal legal procedure
than his lawyer colleagues. A formal restructuring mechanism (along the lines of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism negotiated within the IMF at the beginning of the millennium until negotiations failed in 2004) could
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facilitate an orderly default with negotiated haircuts by overcoming collective action problems, most importantly the
problem of hold-outs (which collective action clauses can only go so far in addressing). (I will spare you the details
on the pros and cons, many explanations on this topic can be found on the website of the International Insolvency
Institute).
What Is Won With A Legal Procedure?
A formal legal procedure for sovereign insolvency (or “resolvency” as Paulus would have it) could legitimate
sovereign debt restructuring by providing for non-discrimination among creditors, making restructuring more
transparent and inclusive and thus potentially more democratic. The latter point was stressed by Mathias Audit,
Professor of Law at Université de Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense). Not too surprisingly, it was the scholars from
the United States who critically questioned enthusiasm for a formal legal procedure. Thus, Anna Gelpern, Professor
of Law at American University, stressed that more was needed to make responses to sovereign default fairer or
more democratic. Law, as we should know, can also work the other way, by entrenching interest and power
constellations. She also pointed out that state banktruptcy in the United States (which currently is not a legal option)
was associated with right-wing politics seeking to weaken labour unions. Michael Waibel (Lecturer of International
Law at Cambridge) with his fascinating account of the Financial Commission of Control instituted in the 19th century
by European powers to administer Greece’s insolvency also wished to caution against over-optimism in legal
engineering.
The presentations and questions from the audience touched upon two speciﬁc issues which indeed may seriously
complicate things and impede the adoption of a formal restructuring mechanism that enhances legitimate debt
restructuring. One is the impact of ﬁnancial instruments such as Credit Default Swaps (insurances against sovereign
default) on the restructuring of sovereign debt. Another (related one) is the impact of the ﬁnance industry’s lobbying
on the political process.
Opinions on how Sovereign Default Swaps aﬀect debt restructuring processes diverged. Ernst-Moritz Lipp, former
chairman of the London Club and thus highly experienced with the restructuring of sovereign debt owed to private
creditors, stressed the contribution of derivatives to fundamental changes in ﬁnancial markets, their increased
intransparency and complexity. These changes made the transmission of defaults unpredictable, no one knew
whom and where exactly default would hit.
Shady Business
To the question how Credit Default Swaps aﬀect concrete restructuring negotiations, he answered that they did not
impede negotiations, that they even might facilitate them. This may be true. Indeed the argument that CDS holders
impede agreement on a haircut because they would gain from a legal default does not seem to hold: CDS holders
are no longer creditors of the sovereign and thus do not participate in the negotiations. However, it also seems true
and was emphasized by Jay Westbrook (Law Professor at University of Texas) that Credit Default Swaps and other
derivatives make the eﬀects of the restructuring unpredictable – eﬀects which may include insolvencies of
systemically important actors such as pension funds or insurances.
The second issue – how the ﬁnance industry impacts the political process — was largely spared. It seems however
crucial, not only since opposition by major ﬁnancial industry associations was one reason for the failure of
negotiations at the IMF for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (as pointed out by Sean Hagan, General
Counsel at the IMF). I agree with John Plender’s recent comment in the FT that “[t]ackling such interest groups both
in the US and Europe is one of the biggest post-crisis tasks for policymakers and a key to addressing concerns
about systemic legitimacy”. It will be interesting to see whether this question will receive more attention at a
conference with slightly (a number of speakers are identical) greater participation of public lawyers in March at the
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid on Responsible Sovereign Financing. In an opening speech Armin von Bogdandy
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will talk about “Sovereign Debt Restructurings as Exercises of Public Authority: Towards a Decentralized Sovereign
Insolvency Law.”
When in his concluding remarks Christoph Paulus tentatively asked whether the questions raised by sovereign
insolvency after all were not merely technical, but might call into doubt the viability of capitalism I was slightly
perplexed. True, questions as to the future of capitalism, its transformations in recent times and possible
reconciliation with the democratic welfare state were not discussed explicitly (except by Alessandro Somma,
Professor of Law at the Università di Ferrara) but they were looming large within the Senatssaal at Humboldt
University.
Why Occupy! Is Crucial
They were the questions that had brought me to this conference in the ﬁrst place and which made me wonder why
so few of my public law colleagues, working on questions of democracy and equality, attended. I do believe that we
as academics have a responsibility to attempt to understand the workings of ﬁnancial markets, their impact on
society, the role of law in shaping them. We have to try to understand in order to better articulate our dismay at
increased inequality, the disappearances of public libraries, swimming pools, unproﬁtable railroad tracks, our
inability to live sustainably. I do not want to buy that this is how we need to live in the future since we lived beyond
our means and now have to do our homework. (I am convinced that there are a lot of things we will need to give up
in order to save the planet (such as excessive air travel or ever new electronic appliances), but I am not ready to
believe that theaters, libraries, railroads, playgrounds, good public schools….must be among them).
For all the need to be rational and understand, however, it is also time to voice concern and call for reform before
everything is completely understood and we can fully predict the eﬀects – say of a ﬁnancial transaction tax or the
banning of over-the-counter traded derivatives. I agree with Ignacio Tirado (Law Professor at Universidad Autonomà
de Madrid) that this is the moment to act, and call for stricter regulation of ﬁnancial markets. This moment will pass if
we wait until we have fully understood everything. We need to express our outrage now (as Alexander Somma did)
at the transformation of welfare capitalism into some other form of capitalism which works well to enhance the
wealth of some, but which fails to promote public welfare.
That’s why I think Occupy! is so important and the criticism that it does no formulate concise demands entirely
mistaken. I also am convinced that we have to bring study and protest back together (at times at least). Seeing all
the black and grey suits at Humboldt University made me wish that our universities would become more colourful
again – places for fundamental debate in what kind of society we want to live, places where protest is voiced and not
only treated as the subject of scientiﬁc study. I was told that protests still happen at Humboldt University. At my
home institution where cafeterias turn into cocktail lounges at night and auditoriums are named after banks this
seems increasingly unlikely.
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